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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                        
_____________ 
 
No. 14-3565 
_____________ 
 
SECRETARY OF LABOR,  
                                 Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 RICHARD KAPOSY, d/b/a Treeman Landscaping, 
                                   Respondent  
_____________ 
        
  On Petition for Review of a Final Order of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission 
OSHC-1 No. 10-2333          
                    
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 13, 2015 
 
Before: SMITH, GREENAWAY, JR., and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: July 20, 2015)                              
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION* 
_____________________        
                       
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 Petitioner, the Secretary of Labor, seeks review of the decision and order of the 
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) that granted Respondent Richard Kaposy relief from 
judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6).  Because the ALJ 
                                                 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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exceeded his authority, we will grant the petition and remand to the ALJ to consider 
Rule 60(b)(6) and whether Kaposy’s case presents extraordinary circumstances. 
I. 
 Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we briefly summarize the 
procedural posture of this case.  While pruning a tree, Kaposy’s employee (and cousin) 
was electrocuted to death when a tree limb came into contact with a power line.  
Following this incident, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) 
issued Kaposy a Citation and Notification of Penalty alleging two willful and five serious 
violations of standards under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (“OSH 
Act”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–78. 
 On February 8, 2011, after a mandatory settlement conference in the 
administrative action, Kaposy, proceeding pro se, filed a withdrawal of notice of contest 
letter, effectively abandoning his previous opposition to the citation.  Nineteen months 
later, on September 13, 2012, Kaposy sent a letter to the Occupational Safety and Health 
Review Commission (“Commission”) requesting the case be reopened.  Kaposy sent both 
communications without the aid of counsel.  The Commission treated Kaposy’s letter as a 
motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), which 
permits vacating a judgment for “any other reason that  justifies relief,” other than those 
reasons enumerated in Rule 60(b)(1)–(5).  Accordingly, the Commission remanded the 
matter to the ALJ to determine whether Kaposy was entitled to such relief.  The 
Commission explicitly stated that Rule 60(b)(1)–(5) could not form the basis for relief.  
 On May 6, 2014, the ALJ held that Kaposy was entitled to relief under 
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Rule 60(b)(6) based on “mistake,” specifically that Kaposy was “mistaken as to the 
ultimate consequences” of the withdrawal of the notice of contest letter.  The ALJ 
recommended the case proceed to a hearing de novo before a different ALJ.  The 
Secretary petitioned for review of the ALJ’s decision by the full Commission.  The 
Commission did not grant review and the Secretary’s petition was deemed denied on 
June 13, 2014. 
II. 
 The Commission had jurisdiction over this proceeding under 29 U.S.C. § 659(c).  
After the Commission declined to review the decision of the ALJ, the ALJ’s decision 
became final.  29 C.F.R. § 2200.73(b).  The Secretary filed his petition for review within 
the sixty-day period prescribed by the OSH Act.  29 U.S.C. § 660(b).  The ALJ’s 
Rule 60(b)(6) order “is treated as an appealable final order because the [Secretary] 
challenges the power of the [ALJ] to take that action irrespective of the merits of the 
order itself.”  Nat’l Passenger R.R. Corp. v. Maylie, 910 F.2d 1181, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990); 
see also Demeretz v. Daniels Motor Freight, Inc., 307 F.2d 469, 472 (3d Cir. 1962).   
“We review grants or denials of relief under Rule 60(b), aside from those raised under 
Rule 60(b)(4), under an abuse of discretion standard.”  Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 
F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008) (footnote omitted). 
III. 
 The ALJ’s analysis conflated Rule 60(b)(1), which provides relief from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding based on “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), with Rule 60(b)(6), which is “‘available only in cases 
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evidencing extraordinary circumstances,’” Lasky v. Cont’l Prods. Corp., 804 F.2d 250, 
256 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting Stradley v. Cortez, 518 F.2d 488, 493 (3d Cir. 1975)); Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).  A decision to exercise discretion under Rule 60(b)(6) is guided by 
various equitable factors, including  
“[1] the general desirability that a final judgment should not be lightly 
disturbed; [2] the procedure provided by Rule 60(b) is not a substitute for 
an appeal; [3] the Rule should be liberally construed for the purpose of 
doing substantial justice; [4] whether, although the motion is made within 
the maximum time, if any, provided by the Rule, the motion is made within 
a reasonable time; ... [5] whether there are any intervening equities which 
make it inequitable to grant relief; [6] any other factor that is relevant to the 
justice of the [order] under attack.” 
Lasky, 804 F.2d at 256 (quoting 6 James Wm. Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal Practice 
¶ 60.9 (2d ed. 1985)) (alterations in original).  Rule 60(b) thus provides “a grand reservoir 
of equitable power to do justice in a particular case.”  Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 122 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Wetzel v. Cox, 135 S. 
Ct. 1548 (2015).  As made patent in Coltec Industries, Inc. v. Hobgood, a movant’s 
particular situation in the context of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion is vitally important.  280 F.3d 
262, 274–75 (3d Cir. 2002).   
 In this case, the Commission remanded to the ALJ solely to evaluate relief under 
Rule 60(b)(6).  By citing considerations relevant to Rule 60(b)(1) (“mistake”), the ALJ 
went beyond its authority in granting Kaposy a new  hearing.  Our review is limited to 
examining the “power of the [ALJ] below to issue its order granting a new [hearing].”  
Demeretz, 307 F.2d at 472; see also Maylie, 910 F.2d at 1183 (evaluating the district 
court’s authority and concluding that its grant of a new trial was timely under Rule 
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60(b)); Cortez v. Trans Union, LLC, 617 F.3d 688, 718 (3d Cir. 2010) (reasoning that 
because the “district court clearly had the authority” to enter a conditional remittitur, the 
Court would not review the contested merits of the district court’s order).  We are without 
authority to review anything beyond whether the ALJ exceeded its power to take the 
action he did, “irrespective of the merits of the order itself.”  See Maylie, 910 F.2d 
at 1183.  Accordingly, the ALJ on remand should consider the Rule 60(b)(6) equitable 
factors described above and whether Kaposy is entitled to a new hearing.    
IV. 
 We will grant the Secretary’s petition and remand to the ALJ to consider whether 
Kaposy is entitled to a new hearing pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6).  
